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Abstract
This paper studies whether a monopolist with private marginal cost information has incen-
tives to make cost-reducing innovations through research and development (R&D) when its
output and price are regulated according to the incentive-compatible mechanism of Baron
and Myerson (1982). Under several assumptions concerning the cost of R&D and the regu-
lator’s beliefs about the marginal cost, we characterize the optimal level of R&D activities
for the regulated monopolist when these activities are observed by the regulator as well
as when they are not. We show that the regulated monopolist always chooses a higher
level of R&D activities when its activities are unobserved. In situations where the social
welfare attaches a sufficiently high weight to the monopolist welfare, the monopolist’s R&D
activities in the unobservable case even realize at a higher level than its activities when
its output and price are not regulated. Moreover, whenever R&D activities increase pro-
ductive efficiency, a less efficient monopolist would choose a higher level of R&D activities
than a more efficient monopolist, irrespective of the observability of R&D.
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1 Introduction
Regulating a natural monopolist with unknown costs has been extensively studied
in the economic literature since the early work of Dupuit (1844, 1952). However, the
first systematic approach is due to Baron and Myerson (B-M) (1982), who introduced
a general social welfare as a function of possible costs and characterized an optimal
set of regulatory rules maximizing the expected value of this welfare. Formally,
B-M restricted themselves by the Revelation Principle [see Dasgupta, Hammond
and Maskin (1979), Myerson (1979), and Harris and Townsend (1981)] to incentive-
compatible mechanisms that require the monopolist to report its unknown marginal
cost and ensure that it has no incentive to lie. The regulatory mechanism proposed
by B-M involves four policy schedules: a price schedule and a quantity schedule which
must be consistent with each other on the market demand curve, a subsidy schedule
specifying at each marginal cost level the monetary transfer from consumers to the
monopolist, and also a probability schedule specifying the range of marginal costs
at which the monopolist will be allowed to sell. Given any mechanism that respects
the incentive-compatibility condition, the regulator can calculate at each marginal
cost level the required net profits the monopolist must obtain, and resultingly the
subsidy it must receive, to truthfully reveal its unknown cost parameter. Consumer
surplus net of this incentive-compatible subsidy constitutes consumer welfare. On
the other hand, for any given α in [0,1], consumer welfare plus α fraction of the
monopolist’s net profits (producer welfare) is called the social welfare. Since the
monopolist’s marginal cost parameter will be known to the regulator only after she
has announced the regulatory mechanism, any welfare consideration the regulator
may have before the revelation of the cost parameter can only be of a Bayesian
nature. Thus, it is necessary to define the expected social welfare, calculating the
mathematical expectation of the social welfare under the regulator’s prior beliefs
about the unknown marginal cost over a given support. The problem of the regulator
is then to choose among all feasible policy schedules, the optimal schedules under
which the expected social welfare will attain its maximum. Given the value of α
used to weight consumer and producer welfare, the optimal price schedule is found
to be such that at any marginal cost, θ, the optimal price exceeds θ by a markup that
equals (1−α) fraction of the marginal informational cost (or the inverse hazard rate)
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at θ. Resultingly, the optimal output schedule lies below the given market demand
curve almost everywhere. On the other hand, the optimal probability schedule allows
the monopolist to sell at any marginal cost level provided that the induced consumer
surplus at the optimal output and price exceeds the fixed cost of production. Finally,
the optimal subsidy schedule requires that the monopolist truthfully reporting its
marginal cost as θ receives a subsidy so high that its welfare equals the area under
the optimal output schedule within the range of possible marginal costs not lower
than θ but also not higher than a critical level above which the optimal probability
schedule prohibits the monopolist from selling its product.
In this paper, we would like to study the question “whether the optimal regu-
latory mechanism of B-M, which provides large enough incentives to the regulated
monopolist for truthfully revealing its private marginal cost, also has any incentives
for the same monopolist to make cost-reducing research and development (R&D) in
a static framework?” To answer this question, we will extend the model of B-M by
adding a pre-regulatory stage in which the monopolist has access to an R&D tech-
nology determined by a publicly known parameter γ ∈ (0, 1) and a control variable
ρ ∈ [0, 1). Basically, this technology will reduce the private marginal cost of the
monopolist from θ to γθ with probability ρ. The parameter γ will be called the
improvement of (successful) R&D. On the other hand, the variable ρ will be deter-
mined by the level of R&D activities, and will be called the probability of success or
the level of R&D activities interchangeably. We will close our model by defining an
R&D cost function with some convenient properties.
Clearly, our assumption that the regulator is completely informed about the im-
provement level of R&D, or relatedly the parameter γ, will simplify our research
problem quite a lot. In situations this assumption does not hold, the regulated firm
would
..., recognize that any investment it may make to increase its efficiency
will result in the regulator seeking information about its post-investment
cost structure in order to establish prices appropriate for the new level
of efficiency. The manner in which the regulator is expected to use the
information to be obtained in the future thus affects the firm’s incentive to
make efficiency-enhancing investments and hence creates a moral hazard
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problem. [Baron and Besanko (1984, p. 268).]
Likewise, we will either completely get rid of (as in Section 3.1) or enormously
simplify (as in Section 3.2) a similar moral hazard problem that might otherwise have
arisen - in a nontrivial way - with regard to the regulator’s information about the
success likelihood ρ, by assuming that the variable ρ, which is directly controlled by
the monopolist’s R&D activities, is either completely observable or completely un-
observable to the regulator. However, despite the simplicity of the R&D technology
stemming from these (analytically) extreme informational assumptions, the question
we have asked above, regarding the desirability of R&D for a monopolist regulated
under (any nondegenerate form of) the B-M mechanism, cannot be straightforwardly
answered like in the case where the production of the same monopolist is not regu-
lated. Obviously, for the unregulated monopolist, any decrease in the marginal cost
would directly increase its expected marginal profit at all output levels since its ex-
pected marginal revenues are independent of R&D. Thus, when the cost of R&D is
sufficiently small, the additional profit the monopolist can expect to earn under R&D
is always positive even if the monopolist chooses not to change the quantity of its
output accordingly. The monopolist could exploit this opportunity by choosing the
level of R&D activities at a point that would simply balance the constant marginal
benefits and varying marginal costs of R&D.
Interestingly, the above conclusions could also be drawn when the price and
output of the monopolist are regulated according to the degenerate form of the B-M
mechanism where consumer and producer welfare have equal weights in the social
welfare (the particular case of α = 1); or equivalently according to the delegatory
regulation scheme proposed by Loeb and Magat (L-M) (1979), where the weight α is
always equal to one. While the B-M mechanism dictates an output schedule that will
admit as an input the marginal cost report of the monopolist, the L-M model allows
the monopolist to choose its output freely. However, because the assumed extremity
of the social welfare with α = 1 eliminates any deadweight loss of subsidy, the
optimal subsidies under both regulatory models become so high that the monopolist
is entitled at each potential output to the whole social surplus. To maximize this
surplus, the monopolist in the L-M model chooses the output at a level consistent
with marginal cost pricing. Equivalently, the optimal output schedule in the B-M
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model coincides with the market demand function when α = 1, so the output at the
truthfully reported marginal cost of the monopolist implies marginal cost pricing,
as well. Therefore, in both models the monopolist’s gross surplus calculated at the
realised output level, i.e., the marginal benefit of R&D, becomes independent of the
level of R&D activities. Consequently, when α = 1, to calculate the optimal R&D
in the case the monopolist is regulated by the B-M mechanism is as straightforward
as to calculate it in the case the monopolist is unregulated.
It is also clear that regardless what the value of the welfare parameter α is, the
monopolist would like to have been endowed, before it was introduced to the given
regulatory environment, with a lower marginal cost to exploit higher informational
rents, since the marginal informational rent is always positive. However, whether the
monopolist can benefit from reducing its present cost of production through R&D is
not clear when α 6= 1, even in situations where the cost of R&D is negligible. The
reason is that the awareness of a Bayesian regulator about the R&D activities of
the monopolist could lead her to revise her beliefs in such a way that the adjusted
demand would be lower at each price level.1 Thus, although a likely cost reduction
through R&D could increase the range of potential costs over which marginal infor-
mational rent will be collected, the downward shift of the adjusted demand curve
would suppress the marginal informational rent at each cost level, hence the ambigu-
ity. With some assumptions on the regulator’s beliefs and R&D costs, we will get rid
of this ambiguity in Section 3.1, where we will characterize the optimal level of R&D
activities chosen by the monopolist when its choice is observable by the regulator
(before she announces her beliefs to the public). We will study in Section 3.2 the
polar case where the R&D activities of the monopolist are never observable. In fact,
this case may be more realistic than the previous case, since
1The sensitivity of the B-M regulatory mechanism to the regulator’s beliefs about the unknown
marginal cost is already known. Crew and Kleindorfer (1986), Vogelsang (1988), Koray and Sertel
(1990), and partially Laffont (1994) criticized the Bayesian approach employed in the B-M model
and in other principal-agent setups dealing with asymmetric information, on the grounds of unac-
countability and moral hazard problems. More recently, Koray and Saglam (2005) explicitly showed
how a non-benevolent regulator in the B-M model can manipulate her beliefs for rent extraction
from the regulated firm or consumers, while Koray and Saglam (2008) studied how the regulator’s
partial learning about the unknown marginal cost affects the regulatory outcome in the B-M model.
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‘Although the regulator may be able to observe dollar outlays allo-
cated to R&D projects that are ostensibly aimed at cost reduction, he
cannot monitor precisely the manner in which these funds are actually
employed, nor can he certify the level of intensity or dedication with
which the R&D efforts are actually pursued.’ [Sappington (1982, p.355).]
In both Section 3.1 and Section 3.2, we will also study how the optimal R&D
choice of the monopolist is affected by several parameters of our model, including
the efficiency of the monopolist, the improvement level of the R&D technology, the
weight of the monopolist welfare relative to consumer welfare, and the maximal size
of demand. In Section 3.3 we will compare the characterization results in Sections
3.1 and 3.2 to establish that the monopolist always chooses a higher level of R&D
activities when its activities are unobservable than when they are observable. Fur-
thermore, in Section 3.4 we will show that in situations where the social welfare
attaches a sufficiently high weight to the monopolist welfare, the unobservable R&D
activities of a regulated monopolist will even realize at a higher level than the activ-
ities of an unregulated monopolist. Finally, we will conclude in Section 4.
We should note here that a problem similar to ours was earlier studied, mostly
in dynamic setups, by a handful of papers. For example, for a two-period monopoly,
Baron and Besanko (1984) considered regulation and innovation through R&D.2
Lewis and Yildirim (2002) studied, in an infinite horizon model with asymmetric
cost information, the optimal regulation of an innovating monopoly that learns from
past experiences. Giuseppe and Vincenti (2004) explored in a multi-period model
the effect of price-cap regulation on cost-reducing efforts. The closest paper to ours
is that of Sappington (1982), who also studied the R&D problem of a single-period
monopoly. However, his informational assumptions as well as his research question
2In the model considered by Baron and Besanko (B-B) (1984), the first period cost is exogenously
given to the monopoly, while the second period cost is influenced by the first-period cost, a stochastic
shock and the level of R&D activities engaged by the monopoly during the first period. The unique
case where the B-B model can be compared to our model arises when the second-period cost is
independent of the first-period cost. In that case, the monopoly has to choose the level of R&D
activities (in the first-period) under symmetric information (about the second-period cost), implying
no moral hazard problem. Consequently, our results become independent of theirs.
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are different from ours.3 To the best of our knowledge, the existing regulation lit-
erature is lacking research on whether a single-period monopoly has incentives to
make (unregulated) cost-reducing innovations through R&D while its production is
regulated under an incentive scheme, like the B-M mechanism. We hope that this
gap will be filled with our paper.
Now, we are ready to present our model. After introducing some basic structures
for the monopolistic market at the beginning of Section 2, we will first present the
regulatory policy proposed by B-M in Section 2.1 and next our extension with R&D
in Section 2.2.
2 Model
Consider a monopolist facing the cost function
C(q, θ) = K + θq if q > 0, and C(0, θ) = 0, (1)
where K ≥ 0 denotes the fixed cost of producing any positive quantity of output and
θ denotes the privately known marginal cost lying in the interval (0, θ1], with θ1 > 0.
The demand faced by the monopolist at the price p is denoted by D(p) and
satisfies
D(p) = D0 −D1p, for all p ∈ [0, D0/D1], (2)
where D0, D1 > 0 and D(θ1) > 0.
4 We restrict ourselves to this simple form of
demand to analyze, in Section 3, the effect of demand shocks (or changes in the
maximal size of demand, D0) on the optimal level of R&D activities. Formally, we
say that there is a demand shock to the monopolist (possibly caused by a change in
consumers’ income or taste) if D0 changes.
3Sappington (1982) aims to find the (linear) incentive schemes that would optimally influence
R&D efforts of the monopolist to maximize consumer surplus (or social welfare). Given the focus
of his study, he also assumes, for simplicity, that the informational asymmetry is not about the
production costs but rather on the costs of employing an R&D technology to reduce costs in terms
of an increase in consumer surplus.
4We also assume for convenience that the parameters D0 and D1 are such that demand is always
nonnegative at all regulated prices in Section 2 and Section 3.
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Given the demand function D, the total value to consumers of an output of
quantity q is
V (q) =
∫ q
0
D−1(x)dx, (3)
and the consumer surplus is V (q)−D−1(q)q.
The price and quantity in the monopolistic market will be determined by a regu-
latory authority. While the regulator does not know the actual value of the marginal
cost of the monopolist, she has prior beliefs about it, represented by the density func-
tion f , which is positive and continuous over its support (0, θ1]. Correspondingly, F
will denote the cumulative distribution function. All in all, the only informational
asymmetry in the above model is about θ; everything else is symmetrically known.
2.1 Baron and Myerson’s (1982) Optimal Regulatory Policy
The class of regulatory policies considered by Baron and Myerson (1982) for the
monopolistic market described above involve outcome functions 〈r, p, q, s〉 that will
be characterized below. Announcing these four functions, the regulator asks the
monopolist to report its marginal cost parameter. If the monopolist reports θ˜ as its
marginal cost, r(θ˜) is the probability that it is allowed to sell, p(θ˜) and q(θ˜) are the
regulated price and quantity of the product respectively, and s(θ˜) is the expected
value of the subsidy the monopolist will receive conditional on the probability that
it is allowed to sell. Then, the expected profit of the monopolist, when it reports θ˜
as its marginal cost while it is actually θ, can be written as
pi(θ˜, θ) =
[
p(θ˜)q(θ˜)− C(q(θ˜), θ)
]
r(θ˜) + s(θ˜). (4)
A regulatory policy 〈r, p, q, s〉 is called feasible if it satisfies the following condi-
tions for all θ ∈ (0, θ1]:
(i) r(θ) is a probability function, i.e.,
0 ≤ r(θ) ≤ 1, (5)
(ii) p(θ) and q(θ) are consistent with each other on the demand curve, i.e.,
q(θ) = D(p(θ)), (6)
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(iii) the regulatory policy is incentive-compatible (truthful revelation is optimal) for
the monopolist, i.e.,
pi(θ, θ) ≥ pi(θ˜, θ), for all θ˜ ∈ (0, θ1], (7)
(iv) the regulatory policy is individually rational for the monopolist under truthful
revelation, i.e.,
pi(θ, θ) ≥ 0. (8)
Now, consider any θ ∈ (0, θ1]. Given a feasible regulatory policy 〈r, p, q, s〉, the
consumer welfare (consumer surplus net of the subsidy paid to the monopolist) and
the producer welfare (operational profits plus subsidy paid by consumers) become
CW (θ) = [V (q(θ))− p(θ)q(θ)] r(θ)− s(θ), (9)
and
pi(θ) ≡ pi(θ, θ) = [p(θ)q(θ)− C(q(θ), θ)] r(θ) + s(θ), (10)
respectively. The social welfare SW (θ) is defined to be a weighted average of con-
sumer welfare CW (θ) and the producer welfare pi(θ). Formally,
SW (θ) = CW (θ) + αpi(θ)
= [V (q(θ))− C(q(θ), θ))] r(θ)− (1− α) pi(θ), (11)
where α ∈ [0, 1] is the weight parameter.
The problem of the regulator, who is uninformed about the actual value of θ, is
to choose a feasible regulatory policy that will lead to the highest expected value of
SW (θ) in (11), conditional on her prior beliefs about θ. Formally, the regulator’s
objective is to find optimal policy functions that will solve
max
r(.),p(.),q(.),s(.)
∫ θ1
0
SW (θ)f(θ)dθ subject to (5)− (8). (12)
Before stating the solution to the above problem, we will put a restriction on the
regulator’s beliefs for the tractability of our analysis in Section 3.5
5The optimal regulatory policy in Baron and Myerson (1982) is characterized without using
Assumption 1.
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Assumption 1. F (θ)/f(θ) is nondecreasing in θ ∈ (0, θ1].
Proposition 1. (Baron and Myerson, 1982) Let Assumption 1 hold. Then,
the solution to the regulator’s problem in (12) is given by the optimal policy 〈r¯, p¯,
q¯, s¯〉 satisfying equations (13)-(16) for all θ ∈ (0, θ1]:
p¯(θ) = θ + (1− α)F (θ)
f(θ)
(13)
q¯(θ) = D(p¯(θ)) (14)
r¯(θ) =
{
1 if V (q¯(θ))− p¯(θ)q¯(θ) ≥ K
0 otherwise
(15)
s¯(θ) = [K + θq¯(θ)− p¯(θ)q¯(θ)] r¯(θ) +
∫ θ1
θ
r¯(x)q¯(x)dx (16)
Note that inserting the optimal subsidy (16) in the above proposition into the
profit equation (10) yields
pi(θ) =
∫ θ1
θ
r¯(x)q¯(x)dx. (17)
Apparently, the welfare of the monopolist purely consists of informational rents.
Since the integrand in (17) is nonnegative everywhere, these rents will be higher, the
lower is the marginal cost of production. Given this negative relationship, a natural
question is whether the monopolist should engage - before regulation takes place -
in cost reducing innovations through R&D and attempt to increase its welfare. The
answer to this question is not trivial - even for environments where the cost of R&D
is negligible - if the monopolist believes that the regulator can detect whether or not
it has made R&D before the revelation of the cost parameter. The reason is that the
effects of R&D on its informational rents will not work simply through reducing the
lower bound of the integral in (17), only. In fact, the regulator’s awareness about
the level of R&D activity could also affect her prior beliefs about the cost parameter
θ, and consequently alter the inverse hazard rate F (θ)/f(θ) and the outcomes of
the optimal policy functions r¯ and q¯ in the integrand of (17). In Section 3.1, we
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will elaborate this point and show how prior beliefs of the regulator depend on the
likelihood of cost reductions (or the level of R&D activities) ρ, when the value of ρ is
observable. Using this dependence, we will characterize conditions under which the
monopolist finds it profitable to make R&D to reduce its production costs.
2.2 An Extension with Research and Development
Consider a pre-regulatory environment in which the monopolist has access to an R&D
facility to reduce its production costs. The technology in this facility is described by
a variable ρ ∈ [0, 1) and a parameter γ ∈ (0, 1). Basically, this technology reduces a
given marginal cost of production θ to the level γθ with probability ρ. (We exclude
ρ = 1, as sure improvement will be assumed to be infinitely costly.) Since one may
expect higher likelihoods of improvement with a higher level of R&D activities, the
variable ρ will be called the level of R&D activities, for brevity. On the other hand,
γ will be called the improvement parameter, since the lower γ is, the higher the
(production) cost reduction obtained from a successful R&D. We assume that the
value of ρ is determined by the monopolist, whereas for simplicity of our analysis the
value of γ is given to the monopolist and also known to the regulator.
We will close our model by introducing R(ρ, γ) to denote the cost of using
the R&D technology (ρ, γ). We assume that the function R is twice continuously
differentiable with respect to both of its arguments and satisfies the following.
Assumption 2. R(0, γ) = 0 (there are no sunk costs of R&D).
Assumption 3. Rρ(ρ, γ) > 0 for all ρ ∈ (0, 1) (R&D cost is increasing with
positive levels of activities).
Assumption 4. Rρ(0, γ) = 0 (marginal cost is zero at zero activity).
Assumption 5. limρ↑1 Rρ(ρ, γ) = ∞ (improvement with certainty increases costs
unboundedly).
Assumption 6. Rρ ρ(ρ, γ) > 0 for all ρ ∈ [0, 1) (R&D cost is strictly convex in the
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level of activities).
Apart from ρ and γ, no parameter in our model affects the cost function R(., .).
Moreover, while this cost function is known to the monopolist, it is completely un-
known to the regulator.6 Because of this informational asymmetry, the regulator will
not be able to optimally revise its regulatory policy in (13)-(16) to influence R&D
activities of the monopolist, even in situations she could completely observe the level
of these activities (the value of ρ).7 Nevertheless, in such cases, the regulator can
use her knowledge about the value of ρ to revise her prior beliefs about the unknown
marginal cost, as we will show in Section 3.1.
3 Results
We will consider the monopolist’s problem of R&D in two distinct cases, depending
on whether or not the regulator is able to observe the monopolist’s R&D activities.
In the first case, the level of R&D activities, i.e., the value of ρ, determined by the
monopolist is fully observed by the regulator, who will use this information to update
her beliefs about the marginal cost of production. In the second case, the value of ρ
is never observed by the regulator. She will therefore (be assumed to) believe that
the regulatory outcome is identical to the proposal of B-M, while it will actually be
altered if the monopolist’s unobserved R&D activities become successful. We leave
inbetween cases involving incomplete information about ρ for future research.
6The asymmetric assumption that the regulator is completely uninformed about R&D costs
while she has incomplete information about production costs should make sense, once we observe
that unlike R&D costs, production costs can be partially or completely inferred or verified by the
regulator through inspecting the quality of the product.
7One can equivalently assume that we consider an environment where the legal system does not
allow the regulatory authority to control R&D.
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3.1 (Fully) Observable R&D
Consider an environment where the regulator can fully observe the level of R&D
activities engaged by the monopolist. Below, we describe the whole regulatory
process in five consecutive stages:
Stage 1: The regulator learns that the R&D technology accessed by the
monopolist is described by the pair of parameters ρ ∈ [0, 1) and γ ∈ (0, 1) and is
such that it will reduce the marginal cost of the monopolist by (1 − γ)100% with
probability ρ. (At this stage, the regulator knows the value of γ; but she does not
know the value of ρ.)
Stage 2: The regulator announces that the regulatory policy is given by the
functions (22)-(25) to be calculated under the beliefs gρ, where the actual value of ρ
will be observed by the regulator in stage 4.
Stage 3: In response to the announced regulatory policy, the monopolist
determines and realizes the level of R&D activities as ρ∗.
Stage 4: The regulator observes ρ∗ and announces gρ
∗
as her actual beliefs.
Stage 5: The monopolist reports its marginal cost, and the corresponding
regulatory outcome is calculated and implemented by the regulator.
Let us now derive the optimal policy the regulator will announce in the second
stage of the above process. As the regulator has become aware, in the first stage, of
an R&D technology described by the unknown parameter ρ and the known parameter
γ, she can update her prior beliefs f(θ) at each θ ∈ (0, θ1) to the posterior beliefs
gρ(θ) for each possible value of ρ ∈ [0, 1) as follows:
gρ(θ) =

ρ
γ
f(θ/γ) + (1− ρ)f(θ) if 0 < θ ≤ γθ1,
(1− ρ)f(θ) if γθ1 < θ ≤ θ1.
(18)
Corresponding to the density function gρ, the cumulative distribution and the inverse
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hazard rate functions can be calculated as
Gρ(θ) =
 ρF (θ/γ) + (1− ρ)F (θ) if 0 < θ ≤ γθ1,ρ+ (1− ρ)F (θ) if γθ1 < θ ≤ θ1, (19)
and
Gρ(θ)
gρ(θ)
=

ρF (θ/γ) + (1− ρ)F (θ)
ρ
γ
f(θ/γ) + (1− ρ)f(θ) if 0 < θ ≤ γθ1,
ρ
(1− ρ)f(θ) +
F (θ)
f(θ)
if γθ1 < θ ≤ θ1,
(20)
respectively. When ρ is zero (the case of no R&D activities), we have gρ(θ) = f(θ),
Gρ(θ) = F (θ), and Gρ(θ)/gρ(θ) = F (θ)/f(θ), as expected.
Given the posterior beliefs gρ, the regulator’s objective is to find optimal policy
functions that will solve
max
r(.),p(.),q(.),s(.)
∫ θ1
0
SW (θ)gρ(θ)dθ subject to (5)− (8). (21)
A natural question is whether the regulatory policy given by (13)-(16) solves the
problem in (21) whenever the inverse hazard rate F/f in that policy is replaced by
the rate Gρ/gρ. The answer is obviously ‘yes’ if Gρ/gρ is nondecreasing.8 For this
property to always hold, Assumption 1 will be strengthened as follows.
Assumption 7. The density f(θ) is nonincreasing in θ ∈ (0, θ1].
The following lemma will be instrumental for the revision of Proposition 1 under
the beliefs gρ.
Lemma 1. Let Assumption 7 hold. Then, for all ρ ∈ [0, 1), the rate Gρ(θ)/gρ(θ) is
increasing in θ ∈ (0, θ1].
8Mimicking the proof of Proposition 1, which was provided by B-M for the case of ρ = 0 in the
extended model of ours, one can easily show that the incentive-compatibility condition in (7) is
satisfied if the inverse hazard rate Gρ(θ)/gρ(θ) is nondecreasing.
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Thanks to Lemma 1, we can modify the optimal regulatory policy of B-M under
observable R&D.
Proposition 2. Let Assumption 7 hold and let the regulator know the R&D tech-
nology (ρ, γ). Then, the solution to the regulator’s problem in (21) is given by the
optimal policy 〈r¯ρ, p¯ρ, q¯ρ, s¯ρ〉 satisfying equations (22)-(25) for all θ ∈ (0, θ1]:
p¯ρ(θ) = θ + (1− α)G
ρ(θ)
gρ(θ)
(22)
q¯ρ(θ) = D(p¯ρ(θ)) (23)
r¯ρ(θ) =
{
1 if V (q¯ρ(θ))− p¯ρ(θ)q¯ρ(θ) ≥ K
0 otherwise
(24)
s¯ρ(θ) = [K + θq¯ρ(θ)− p¯ρ(θ)q¯ρ(θ)] r¯ρ(θ) +
∫ θ1
θ
r¯ρ(x)q¯ρ(x)dx (25)
Apparently, when ρ = 0, the optimal policy in the above proposition reduces to
the policy (13)-(16) proposed by B-M; i.e., 〈p¯0, q¯0, r¯0, s¯0〉 = 〈p¯, q¯, r¯, s¯〉. In fact, we
could have derived Proposition 1 as a direct corollary to Proposition 2.9 To see the
effect of ρ ∈ (0, 1) on the optimal regulatory outcome, the following assumption will
be useful.
Assumption 8. F (γθ)/f(γθ) < γF (θ)/f(θ), for all θ ∈ (0, θ1].
Assumption 8 requires that the gross rate of change in the inverse hazard rate due
to R&D is (weakly) bounded from above by the parameter γ. As an example, the
uniform density function f(θ) = 1/θ1 on (0, θ1] satisfies both of Assumptions 7 and
8. Indeed, these two assumptions will yield the below lemma as well as a corollary
to Proposition 2.
9We have preferred to explicitly present Proposition 1 as well as the background calculations in
Section 2.1, in order to prepare the reader for the ensuing discussion (in page 10) as to whether
R&D can be desirable for the monopolist in the B-M Model.
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Lemma 2. Let Assumptions 7 and 8 hold. Then, for all θ ∈ (0, θ1], the inverse
hazard rate Gρ(θ)/gρ(θ) is increasing and convex in ρ ∈ [0, 1).
Corollary 1. Let Assumptions 7 and 8 hold. Then, for all θ ∈ (0, θ1] and all
α ∈ [0, 1), the regulated output, q¯ρ(θ), is decreasing in ρ ∈ [0, 1).
The above result follows from the fact that with a higher level of R&D activi-
ties, the inverse hazard rate, i.e., the marginal informational cost, is also higher, as
ensured by Lemma 2. Thus, in situations where the regulated price depends on the
marginal informational cost (i.e., the cases where α 6= 1), the regulated price will
be higher, while the regulated output will be lower, with an increase in the level of
R&D activities.
We will simplify the rest of our analysis, by the following assumption. (As we
will need this assumption in Section 3.2 and Section 3.4 for the case of ρ = 0 only,
we will state it here for each ρ separately.)
Assumption 9-[ρ]. V (q¯ρ(θ1))− p¯ρ(θ1)q¯ρ(θ1) > K.
To see the consequence of making the above assumption, we should note that for all
θ ∈ (0, θ1]
d [V (q¯ρ(θ))− p¯ρ(θ)q¯ρ(θ)]
dθ
= −dp¯
ρ(θ)
dθ
q¯ρ(θ) < 0, (26)
implying that consumer surplus is decreasing in θ ∈ (0, θ1]. Thus, Assumption 9-[ρ]
along with equation (24) will guarantee that when the level of R&D activities is
equal to ρ, the monopolist will always be allowed to produce, i.e., r¯ρ(.) = 1.
After the regulator has announced the regulatory policy (22)-(25) in Stage 2, the
monopolist will choose, in Stage 3, the level of R&D activities. Let pi(θ, ρ) denote
the profit of the monopolist if its marginal cost is θ after R&D is completed. Thus,
pi(θ, ρ) = [p¯ρ(θ)q¯ρ(θ)− C(q¯ρ(θ), θ)] r¯ρ(θ) + s¯ρ(θ)−R(ρ, γ). (27)
When Assumption 9-[ρ] holds, inserting (22)-(25) into (27) yields
pi(θ, ρ) =
∫ θ1
θ
q¯ρ(x)dx−R(ρ, γ). (28)
16
Likewise, pi(γθ, ρ) will denote the profit of the monopolist if its marginal cost is γθ
after R&D is completed. Then, the expected profit pie(θ, ρ) of the monopolist when
its marginal cost θ is reduced to γθ with probability ρ can be written as
pie(θ, ρ) = ρpi(γθ, ρ) + (1− ρ)pi(θ, ρ), (29)
or simply
pie(θ, ρ) = B(θ, ρ)−R(ρ, γ), (30)
with
B(θ, ρ) =
∫ θ1
θ
q¯ρ(x)dx+ ρ
∫ θ
γθ
q¯ρ(x)dx (31)
denoting the expected benefit of the monopolist. The first term in equation (31) is
the (sure) informational rent obtained by the monopolist irrespective of the success
of R&D, whereas the second term is its (expected) additional informational rent
obtained when the marginal cost is reduced from θ to γθ with probability ρ.
The monopolist will engage in a positive level of R&D activities (ρ > 0) only if
the resulting expected profits exceeds profits under no activity (ρ = 0), i.e.,
pie(θ, ρ)− pie(θ, 0) =
∫ θ1
θ
[
q¯ρ(x)− q¯0(x)] dx+ ρ∫ θ
γθ
q¯ρ(x)dx−R(ρ, γ) ≥ 0, (32)
using R(0, γ) = 0 by Assumption 2. Under the above condition, the monopolist’s
problem of R&D can be written as follows:
max
ρ∈[0,1)
pie(θ, ρ) subject to (32). (33)
Let ρ∗(θ) denote the solution to the above problem. When ρ∗(θ) is an interior
solution, it satisfies the first-order condition
Bρ(θ, ρ
∗(θ)) = Rρ(ρ∗(θ), γ), (34)
where
Bρ(θ, ρ) =
∫ θ1
θ
q¯ρρ(x)dx+
∫ θ
γθ
q¯ρ(x)dx+ ρ
∫ θ
γθ
q¯ρρ(x)dx (35)
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for any ρ ∈ [0, 1). In the above equation, the second integral is always positive,
whereas the first and third integrals are negative unless α = 1 (by Corollary 1).
Therefore, the sign of Bρ(θ, ρ) is, in general, ambiguous. For arbitrarily small values
of ρ, we will get rid of this ambiguity by assuming the following.
Assumption 10. Bρ(θ, 0) > 0 for all θ ∈ (0, θ1].
Note that given equation (35), Assumption 10 requires(∫ θ1
θ
q¯ρρ(x)dx+
∫ θ
γθ
q¯ρ(x)dx
)∣∣∣
ρ=0
> 0, (36)
for all θ ∈ (0, θ1]. Below, we show that this condition is satisfied if the social welfare
attaches a sufficiently high weight to the monopolist welfare.
Remark 1. Let Assumption 9-[0] hold. Then, Assumption 10 will be satisfied if α
is sufficiently close to 1.
The following Lemma will be instrumental for the rest of our results in Section 3.1.
Lemma 3. Pick any ρ ∈ [0, 1). Let Assumptions 6-8 and Assumption 9-[ρ] hold.
Then, pieρρ(θ, ρ) < 0 for all θ ∈ (0, θ1].
Now, we can state our first characterization result.
Proposition 3. Suppose that the R&D activities of the monopolist are observable.
Let Assumptions 2-8 and 10 hold and also let Assumption 9-[ρ] hold for all ρ ∈ [0, 1).
Then, for all θ ∈ (0, θ1], the optimal level of R&D activities, ρ∗(θ), for the monopolist
is unique, lies in (0,1), and satisfies(∫ θ1
θ
q¯ρρ(x)dx+
∫ θ
γθ
q¯ρ(x)dx+ ρ
∫ θ
γθ
q¯ρρ(x)dx
)∣∣∣
ρ=ρ∗(θ)
= Rρ(ρ
∗(θ), γ). (37)
Figure 1 illustrates how to graphically obtain the optimal level of R&D activities,
ρ∗(θ), satisfying equation (37). Note that if α 6= 1, the marginal benefit curve Bρ(θ, ρ)
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becomes the downward sloping curve in this figure. For this case, we find ρ∗(θ) at
the intersection of the marginal benefit and cost (green and red) curves. On the
other hand, if α = 1, the regulated output function becomes independent of ρ, since
q¯ρ(.) = q¯(.) = D(.). In this case, the marginal benefit curve becomes the (dotted)
horizontal line. Corollary 4 will later show (by proving the inequality Bρα(θ, .) > 0)
that ρ∗(θ) is in a positive relationship with α, implying that the optimal level of
R&D activities in the case α = 1 is higher than in the case α 6= 1, as also apparent
from Figure 1.
Rρ(ρ,γ)
0 ρ*(θ) 1 ρ
Bρ(θ,ρ)   if α ϵ [0,1)
θ
γθ
Bρ(θ,ρ)= ʃ D(x)dx  if α =1
Figure 1. Observable R&D Choice of a Regulated Monopolist
Below, we will examine how the optimal level of R&D activities varies with the
marginal cost. However, we have to introduce first an assumption, ensuring that
R&D activities, when successful, will increase productive efficiency at the regulated
output.
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Assumption 11-[ρ]. Under the regulated output function q¯ρ(.), production costs
are lower when R&D is successful than when it is not; i.e., C(q¯ρ(γθ), γθ) < C(q¯ρ(θ), θ)
for all θ ∈ (0, θ1].
Corollary 2. Let Assumptions 2-8 and 10 hold and Assumptions 9-[ρ] and 11-[ρ]
hold for all ρ ∈ [0, 1). Then, the optimal level of R&D activities, ρ∗(θ), is increasing
in θ ∈ (0, θ1].
Interestingly, the above result implies that in regulatory environments where
R&D activities increase productive efficiency, a less efficient monopolist always would
always choose a higher level of R&D activities than a more efficient monopolist.
Now we can explore the dependence of ρ∗(θ) on the parameter γ. For this,
we need to estimate Bργ(θ, .), the response of the marginal benefit schedule to γ.
Unfortunately, the impact of γ on the partial derivative q¯ρρ(.) appearing in the
first and third integrals of (35) is indeterminate because of the ambiguous effect
of γ on the marginal informational cost function Gρ(.)/gρ(.) and its rate of change
∂[Gρ(θ)/gρ(θ)]/∂ρ. However, in situations where the welfare weight α is sufficiently
close to 1, the effect of these two terms on q¯ρ(.) and ∂q¯ρ(.)/∂ρ become negligible.
In such situations, the impact of γ on ρ∗(θ) can be predicted, provided that the
following assumption is also satisfied.
Assumption 12. Rρ,γ(ρ, γ) > 0 for all ρ ∈ [0, 1) and γ ∈ (0, 1) (marginal cost of
R&D activities is decreasing with the improvement level, i.e., increasing in γ).
Corollary 3. Let Assumptions 2-8 and 12 hold and Assumption 9-[ρ] hold for
all ρ ∈ [0, 1). If α is sufficiently close to one, then for all values of θ ∈ (0, θ], the
optimal level of R&D activities, ρ∗(θ), is increasing with the improvement level, i.e.,
decreasing in γ ∈ (0, 1).
The above result is intuitive once we observe (from the above discussion) that
when α is sufficiently close to one, the effect of an increase in the improvement level
of R&D (or a decrease in γ) on the marginal benefit Bρ(θ, ρ) can be approximated,
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thanks to the resulting negligibility of the first and third integrals in (35), by the
increase in the uncertain marginal benefit of R&D, i.e.,
∫ θ
γθ
q¯ρ(x)dx, through the
expansion of the range of integration [θγ, θ]. Thus, we expect the curve Bρ(θ, ρ) in
Figure 1 to shift up when γ decreases. On the other hand, the cost curve R(ρ, γ)
would shift down under Assumption 12, yielding an increase in ρ∗(θ).
In the next corollary, we show that when the social welfare is more equitable or
the demand for the regulated product is higher, the monopolist will choose a higher
level of R&D activities.
Corollary 4. Let Assumptions 2-8 and 10 hold and Assumption 9-[ρ] hold for all
ρ ∈ [0, 1). Then, for all values of θ ∈ (0, θ1], the optimal level of R&D activities,
ρ∗(θ), is increasing in both α ∈ [0, 1] and D0 ∈ (0,∞).
It should be obvious from the optimal policy in (22)-(25) that the higher the
welfare parameter α or the higher the maximal demand, D0, the higher will be
marginal informational rent at each cost level, and consequently the higher will be
the marginal benefit of R&D, implying a higher value for ρ∗(θ).
3.2 (Fully) Unobservable R&D
In this environment, R&D activities of the monopolist are unobserved by the regula-
tor. So, we assume that the regulator, right before announcing the optimal regulatory
policy, believes that the monopolist has not, so far, engaged in any R&D activities
(ρ = 0) while it actually has (ρ > 0). Resultingly, the binding beliefs of the regulator
will be equal to her prior beliefs, i.e., g0(.) = f(.), and the optimal regulatory policy
will be 〈r¯, p¯, q¯, s¯〉, given by (13)-(16) calculated under the regulator’s prior beliefs f .
The monopolist will exploit this situation involving asymmetric information about
the value of ρ, as we will show below.
To simplify the rest of our analysis, we will suppose that Assumption 9-[0] holds,
implying that r¯(.) = 1. Now, let us fix θ ∈ (0, θ1] and γ ∈ (0, 1). When the level of
R&D activities is ρ, the profit expected by the monopolist can be written as
pie(θ, ρ) = ρpi(γθ) + (1− ρ)pi(θ)−R(ρ, γ), (38)
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or simply
pie(θ, ρ) = B(ρ, γ)−R(ρ, γ) (39)
with
B(ρ, γ) =
∫ θ1
θ
q¯(x)dx+ ρ
∫ θ
γθ
q¯(x)dx (40)
denoting the expected benefit of the monopolist. Differentiating pie(θ, ρ) with respect
to ρ yields
pieρ(θ, ρ) = Bρ(ρ, γ)−Rρ(ρ, γ) =
∫ θ
γθ
q¯(x)dx−Rρ(ρ, γ). (41)
Clearly, pieρ(θ, 0) > 0 and limρ↑1 pi
e
ρ(θ, ρ) = −∞.
The monopolist will choose a positive level of R&D activities (ρ > 0) only if the
resulting expected profits exceeds the profits under no activity (ρ = 0), i.e.,
pie(θ, ρ) ≥ pie(θ, 0) (42)
or equivalently
ρ
∫ θ
γθ
q¯(x)dx−R(ρ, γ) ≥ 0, (43)
using R(0, γ) = 0 by Assumption 2. The above inequality requires that the expected
additional informational rent is not below the average cost of R&D activities, i.e.,∫ θ
γθ
q¯(x)dx ≥ R(ρ, γ)
ρ
. (44)
Using this last condition, the monopolist’s R&D problem can be written as follows:
max
ρ∈[0,1)
pie(θ, ρ) subject to (44). (45)
We can now state our second characterization result.
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Proposition 4. Suppose that the R&D activities of the monopolist are unobservable.
Let Assumptions 1-6 and 9-[0] hold. Then, for all θ ∈ (0, θ1], the optimal level of
R&D activities, ρ∗(θ), for the monopolist is unique, lies in (0,1), and satisfies∫ θ
γθ
q¯(x)dx = Rρ(ρ
∗(θ), γ). (46)
Figure 2 illustrates how the optimal activity level ρ∗(θ) balances the marginal
benefit and marginal cost of R&D activities. Here, the marginal benefit curve is
always horizontal unlike in Figure 1. In fact, this horizontal curve always lies above
the varying marginal benefit curve in Figure 1. This will enable us to compare the
optimal level of R&D activities in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, which we leave to Section
3.3.
ʃ q(x)dx‾θ
Rρ(ρ,γ)
γθ
Bρ(θ,ρ)=
0 ρ*(θ) 1 ρ
Figure 2. Unobservable R&D Choice of a Regulated Monopolist
The following result shows that our finding in Corollary 2, linking the optimal
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level of R&D activities negatively to the productive efficiency, is also valid when
R&D activities are unobservable.
Corollary 5. Let Assumptions 1-6, 9-[0], and 11-[0] hold. Then, the optimal level
of R&D activities, ρ∗(θ), is increasing in θ ∈ (0, θ1].
Likewise, Corollary 6 will show that the inability of the regulator to observe the
R&D activities of the monopolist has no effect on the direction of the relationship
between the optimal level of R&D activities and several parameters of our model,
involving γ, α, and D0.
Corollary 6. Let Assumptions 1-6, 9-[0] and 12 hold. Then, for all θ ∈ (0, θ1], the
optimal level of R&D activities, ρ∗(θ), is increasing in α ∈ [0, 1] and D0 ∈ (0,∞),
while decreasing in γ ∈ (0, 1) (or increasing in the improvement level).
3.3 Effect of Observability on the Monopolist’s R&D Choice
Now, we will explore how the presence of observability affects the level of R&D
activities chosen by the monopolist. Basically, we will compare the values of ρ∗(θ)
calculated in Sections 3.1 and 3.2. This comparison will critically depend on whether
the regulator weights the welfares of consumers and the monopolist equally or not.
Proposition 5. Let Assumptions 2-8 and 10 hold and Assumption 9-[ρ] hold for
all ρ ∈ [0, 1). Then for all θ ∈ (0, θ1], the optimal level of R&D activities, ρ∗(θ), for
the monopolist is (i) independent of the observability of R&D if α = 1, (ii) lower
when R&D activities are observable than when they are not if α ∈ [0, 1).
Part (i) of the above result stems from the observation that with α = 1, we
have q¯p(θ) = q¯(θ) = D(θ). This implies that under Assumption 9-[0], the marginal
benefits of R&D are the same (as given by Bρ(θ, ρ) =
∫ θ
γθ
D(x)dx) in Section 3.1
and Section 3.2. On the other hand, part (ii) of Proposition 5 follows from the fact
that the marginal informational rent function (or the adjusted demand function)
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has lower values when R&D activities are observable than when they are not, i.e.,
q¯ρ(.) < q¯0(.) = q¯(.) for all ρ ∈ (0, 1), also implying lower marginal benefits of
R&D under observability. (The dotted horizontal line in Figure 1 corresponds to the
marginal benefit curve of unobservable R&D activities, which is always above the
downward sloping marginal benefit curve of observable R&D activities.)
We should also note that Proposition 5, along with Propositions 3 and 4, im-
plies that for each θ ∈ (0, θ1], the optimal level of R&D activities, ρ∗(θ), attains its
maximal level when α = 1, i.e., whenever the outcome under the Baron and Myer-
son’s (1982) regulatory policy essentially boils down to the outcome under Loeb and
Magat’s (1979) delegation scheme. The reason is that the monopolist in this par-
ticular case is entitled to the whole social surplus under the original demand curve
(within the range of possible marginal costs). Thus, the (constant) marginal benefit
of investing in R&D will be at its highest level, implying that for any level of the
marginal cost the optimal R&D choice will also be at its maximum.
Finally, our results in Section 3.1 and Section 3.2 also show that regardless
whether R&D activities are observable or not, the optimal level of R&D activities,
ρ∗(θ), is increasing in θ, α and D0 and decreasing in γ.
3.4 Effect of Output Regulation on the Monopolist’s R&D
Choice
Finally, we will estimate the impact of output regulation on the monopolist’s R&D
choice. For this, we have to calculate first the optimal level of R&D activities for the
monopolist when the price and output of its product are not regulated.
Let us pick any θ ∈ (0, θ1]. One can easily verify that when the unregulated
monopoly does not make any R&D, it would optimally choose the price and output
of its product as pm(θ) = (D0 + D1θ)/2 and q
m(θ) = (D0 − D1θ)/2, respectively.
Resultingly, the monopolist’s profit, pim(θ), would become
pim(θ) = pm(θ)qm(θ)− θqm(θ)−K = (D0 −D1θ)
2
4D1
−K. (47)
On the other hand, the profit the monopolist can expect under the possibility of
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R&D is equal to
pim,e(θ, ρ) = ρpim(γθ) + (1− ρ)pim(θ)−R(ρ, γ), (48)
or simply
pim,e(θ, ρ) = B(θ, ρ)−R(ρ, γ), (49)
with
Bm(θ, ρ) = ρ
(D0 −D1γθ)2
4D1
+ (1− ρ)(D0 −D1θ)
2
4D1
−K (50)
denoting the expected benefit of the monopolist. The monopolist will choose a
positive level of R&D activities (ρ > 0) if and only if
pim,e(θ, ρ)− pim,e(θ, 0) ≥ 0 (51)
or equivalently
pim(γθ)− pim(θ) ≥ R(ρ, γ)
ρ
, (52)
using R(0, γ) = 0 by Assumption 2. Thus, the monopolist’s R&D problem can be
written as
max
ρ∈[0,1)
pim,e(θ, ρ), subject to (52). (53)
Noting that
pim,eρ (θ, ρ) = B
m
ρ (θ, ρ)−Rρ(ρ, γ)
=
(1− γ)θ
2
D
(
(1 + γ)θ
2
)
−Rρ(ρ, γ) (54)
and
pim,eρρ (θ, ρ) = −Rρρ(ρ, γ), (55)
we are ready to present our final characterization.
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Proposition 6. Let Assumption 2-6 hold. If the price and output of the monopolist
are not regulated, then for all θ ∈ (0, θ1], the optimal level of R&D activities, ρm(θ),
for the monopolist is unique, lies in (0,1), and satisfies
(1− γ)θ
2
D
(
(1 + γ)θ
2
)
= Rρ(ρ
m(θ), γ). (56)
Using the characterizations provided by Propositions 4 and 6, we can compare
the optimal R&D choice of a regulated monopolist whose R&D activities are
unobservable to the optimal R&D choice of an unregulated monopolist, provided
that the regulator treats the welfares of consumer and the monopolist sufficiently
equally.
ʃ q(x)dx‾θ
Rρ(ρ,γ)
γθ
Bρ(θ,ρ)=
0 ρm(θ) 1 ρ
Bmρ(θ,ρ) = pim(γθ) ─  pim(θ)
Figure 3. R&D Choice of an Unregulated Monopolist
Proposition 7. Let Assumptions 1-6 and 9-[0] hold. If α is sufficiently close to 1,
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then the optimal level of R&D activities for the monopolist is always higher when its
price and output are regulated by the optimal policy (13)-(16) and its R&D activities
are unobservable than when its price and output are not regulated at all. That is,
ρ∗(θ) satisfying (46) is higher than ρm(θ) satisfying (56).
Figure 3 illustrates the above result graphically. (Apparently, the intersection
of the dotted horizontal line, depicting the curve for the marginal benefits of unob-
servable R&D activities, with the upward sloping marginal cost curve is above the
optimal level of R&D activities, ρm(θ), chosen by an unregulated monopolist.) The
result in Proposition 7 is intuitive since in the extreme case where the regulator’s
objective attaches equal weights to the welfares of consumers and the monopolist,
the outcome of the regulatory incentive-compatible policy used in the monopoly mar-
ket coincides with the outcome of the delegation scheme of Loeb and Magat (1979),
which entitles the monopolist to the whole social surplus at the sold output. This
surplus always exceeds the unregulated monopoly profit, offering higher incentives
to the monopolist for investing in R&D when its production is regulated than when
it is not.
On the other hand, in cases where the social welfare favors consumer welfare too
much in relative to producer welfare (i.e., α is sufficiently small), it is not possible
to compare the R&D choice of the regulated monopolist to that of the unregulated
monopolist even in the simpler situation where R&D is unobservable. The reason is
that under the regulatory policy (13)-(16), the adjusted demand schedule q¯(.) affect-
ing the informational rents of the monopolist nontrivially depends on the beliefs of
the regulator through the inverse hazard rate function F/f , whose range may involve
any positive real. However, it is also obvious that the lower the weight parameter α
is, the higher will be the effect of the inverse hazard rate on the quantity schedule.
In other words, the lower the parameter α, the more suppressed the marginal benefit
curve of the regulated monopolist, implying that the difference ρ∗(θ) − ρm(θ) will
also be lower.
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4 Conclusion
In this paper we have considered a monopolist with unknown marginal costs and
studied whether the incentive-compatible mechanism of Baron and Myerson (1982),
which optimally regulates the price and output of the monopolistic product, can pro-
vide sufficiently large incentives to the monopolist to make cost-reducing innovations
through R&D. The R&D technology the monopolist has access to is defined by the
improvement and probability parameters. The improvement parameter that is given
to the monopolist measures the reduction in the marginal cost if R&D becomes suc-
cessful. On the other hand, the probability parameter which is directly controlled by
the monopolist through its R&D activities measures the success likelihood of R&D.
While we let the monopolist in our model to freely choose the level of its R&D
activities, we allow for an environment where realised R&D level is observable by
the regulator as well as an environment where it is not. For both environments, we
characterize the optimal level of R&D activities chosen by the monopolist as well
as conditions ensuring that the optimal level is unique and positive. Irrespective of
the observability of R&D, we find that the optimal level of R&D activities is higher
when the monopolist is productively less efficient, provided that R&D activities al-
ways increase productive efficiency. In addition, the improvement level of R&D, the
maximal size of demand and the relative weight of the monopolist welfare have, all,
positive impacts on the optimal level of R&D activities.
A comparison of our characterization results shows that the optimal level of R&D
activities is, in general, lower when R&D activities are observable by the regulator
than when they are not. The underlying reason is that the incentive-compatible
mechanism that regulates the production of the monopolist dictates, at each possi-
ble marginal cost θ, a price that exceeds the value of θ by an informational markup
depending on the regulator’s prior beliefs about θ. When R&D activities are ob-
servable, this informational markup is found to be increasing with the level of R&D
activities. Thus, the regulated price will be higher and oppositely the regulated out-
put will be lower when the level of R&D activities is positive (ρ > 0) and observable
than when it is not observable and believed by the regulator to be zero (ρ = 0).
As the regulator’s awareness of R&D shifts the regulated output schedule down,
the informational rents received by the regulated monopolist becomes reduced, also
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reducing the marginal benefit of R&D.
Our findings also include that when the social welfare attaches a sufficiently
high weight to the monopolist welfare, the unobservable R&D choice of a regulated
monopolist is always higher than the R&D choice of an unregulated monopolist.
This stems from the fact that when the deadweight loss of subsidy is negligible,
the welfare of the regulated monopolist under unobservable R&D activities would
become as high as the whole social surplus at the sold output. Indeed, this extreme
value of the surplus, constituting the marginal benefit of R&D, would provide for
the regulated monopolist the most extreme incentives for cost reducing innovations.
An important extension of our model would be the consideration of environments
where the regulator’s information about the likelihood of success - and or the im-
provement level - of R&D is incomplete. Fruitfully, one can also consider a setup
where the regulator is authorized not only to control the price and output of the
monopolistic product but also to control or influence its R&D activities. It may be
interesting to check, in that setup, the extension of a well-known proposition of Ar-
row (1959), claiming that an (unregulated) monopolist always has a lower incentive
to innovate than a social planner and therefore its R&D choice is socially subopti-
mal. In fact, in situations where the social welfare treats consumer and producer
welfare equally α = 1, our results readily show that the regulated monopolist and the
social planner would always have the same incentive to innovate, since irrespective
of observability the regulatory output policy in this case would boil down to the pol-
icy consistent with marginal cost pricing, implying that the welfare (informational
rents) of the monopolist becomes as high as the whole social surplus. On the other
hand, it is also clear that in situations where α 6= 1, the incentives of the regulated
monopolist and the social planner would no longer be aligned because of the dead-
weight loss of subsidy, which is not internalized by the monopolist. Future study
may explore whether in this case the unregulated R&D activities of the regulated
monopolist would be socially excessive or inadequate.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. See pages 920-921 of Baron and Myerson (1982). 
Proof of Lemma 1. Pick any ρ ∈ [0, 1). Assumption 7 ensures that Gρ(θ)/gρ(θ)
is increasing in θ ∈ (0, θ1] if θ 6= γθ1. One can also check that
Gρ(γθ1)
gρ(γθ1)
− lim
θ↓γθ1
Gρ(θ)
gρ(θ)
=
−f(θ1)F (γθ1)− ρ(1−ρ)f(θ1)
f(γθ1)
[
f(θ1) +
γ(1−ρ)
ρ
f(γθ1)
] < 0, (57)
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completing the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Directly obtained by mimicking the proof of Proposition
1 (thanks to Lemma 1). 
Proof of Lemma 2. Differentiating (20) with respect to ρ yields
∂ [Gρ(θ)/gρ(θ)]
∂ρ
=

F (θ/γ)f(θ)− 1
γ
F (θ)f(θ/γ)
[ρf(θ/γ) + (1− ρ)f(θ)]2 if 0 < θ ≤ γθ1,
1
(1− ρ)2f(θ) if γθ1 < θ ≤ θ1.
(58)
The second line of the above derivative is always positive. Rewriting Assumption 8
for any θ ∈ (0, γθ1] as F (θ)/f(θ) < γF (θ/γ)/f(θ/γ), we obtain that the first line
of (58) is positive, as well. This proves that Gρ(θ)/gρ(θ) is increasing in ρ. Also,
∂[Gρ(θ)/gρ(θ)]/∂ρ is nondecreasing in ρ, by Assumption 7. 
Proof of Corollary 1. Directly obtained from equations (22) and (23), given
Lemma 2. 
Proof of Remark 1. By Assumption 9-[0], Assumption 10 holds if (36)
is satisfied. Pick any θ ∈ (0, θ1]. We have q¯0(θ) = q¯(θ) and therefore,∫ θ
γθ
q¯0(x)dx =
∫ θ
γθ
q¯(x)dx, which is always positive, by equations (13) and (14). Now,
let α = 1. For all ρ ∈ [0, 1), q¯ρ(θ) = q¯(θ) = D(θ), implying ∂q¯ρ(θ)/∂ρ = 0. Thus,
Bρ(θ, 0) =
∫ θ
γθ
q¯(x)dx > 0. Since both q¯ρ(.) and q¯ρρ(.) are continuous in α, (36) holds
for all α ∈ [0, 1] which are sufficiently close to 1. 
Proof of Lemma 3. Pick any θ ∈ (0, θ1] and ρ ∈ [0, 1). Since Assumption 9-[ρ]
holds, Bρ(θ, ρ) is given by (35). Differentiating Bρ(θ, ρ) with respect to ρ yields
Bρ ρ(θ, ρ) =
∫ θ1
θ
q¯ρρρ(x)dx+ 2
∫ θ
γθ
q¯ρρ(x)dx+ ρ
∫ θ
γθ
q¯ρρρ(x)dx. (59)
First let α ∈ [0, 1). Thanks to Assumptions 7 and 8, we have q¯ρρ(θ) < 0 by Corollary
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1, and
q¯ρρρ(θ) = D
′(p¯ρ(θ))(1− α)∂
2 (Gρ(θ)/gρ(θ))
∂ρ2
≤ 0, (60)
by Lemma 2. Therefore, Bρρ(θ, ρ) < 0. Now let α = 1. Then, we have
qρ(.) = q¯(.) = D(.), implying Bρρ(θ, ρ) = 0. Thus, for all α ∈ [0, 1], we have
Bρρ(θ, ρ) ≤ 0. Moreover, we have Rρ ρ(θ, ρ) > 0 by Assumption 6, implying
pieρ ρ(θ, ρ) < 0. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Pick any θ ∈ (0, θ1]. By Proposition 2 (thanks to As-
sumption 7), the optimal regulatory policy is given by (22)-(25). Note from equations
(34) and (35) that under Assumption 9-[ρ], equation (37) is the first order condition
for the problem in (33). Assumption 5 implies that ρ∗(θ) < 1. On the other hand,
Assumptions 3-5 along with Assumption 10 and the continuity of pie(θ, ρ) in ρ imply
that ρ∗(θ) > 0.
Now, pick any ρ ∈ [0, 1) and note that pieρ ρ(θ, ρ) < 0 by Lemma 3 (thanks to
Assumptions 6-8 and 9-[ρ]). Thus, ρ∗(θ) satisfies the second-order condition and it
is unique.
Finally, note that Assumptions 4 and 10 imply pieρ(θ, 0) > 0, while the continuity
of Bρ(θ, ρ) and Rρ(ρ, γ) with respect to ρ imply that pi
e
ρ(θ, ρ) is continuous in ρ.
Since we have already found that ρ∗(θ) is the unique maximizer of pie(θ, ρ) among all
ρ ∈ [0, 1), we must have pie(θ, ρ∗(θ))− pie(θ, 0) > 0, ensuring the feasibility condition
(32). 
Proof of Corollary 2. Pick any θ ∈ (0, θ1]. Since Assumptions 2-8 and 10 hold and
Assumption 9-[ρ] holds for all ρ ∈ [0, 1), Proposition 3 ensures that ρ∗(θ) is unique,
lies in (0,1), and satisfies pieρ(θ, ρ
∗(θ)) = 0 as in (37). Now, pick any ρ ∈ [0, 1). By
Assumption 9-[ρ], Bρ(θ, ρ) is given by (35). Differentiating (35) with respect to θ
yields
Bρ θ(θ, ρ) = q¯
ρ(θ)− γq¯ρ(γθ) + ρ [q¯ρρ(θ)− q¯ρρ(γθ)]− q¯ρρ(θ)
= q¯ρ(θ)− γq¯ρ(γθ) + (ρ− 1)q¯ρρ(θ)− ρq¯ρρ(γθ). (61)
First let α ∈ [0, 1). By Corollary 1 (thanks to Assumptions 7 and 8), q¯ρρ(θ) < 0. Now
let α = 1. Then q¯ρρ(θ) = 0, since q¯
ρ(θ) = q¯(θ) = D(θ). So, for all α ∈ [0, 1], we have
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q¯ρρ(θ) ≤ 0. On the other hand, by Assumption 11-[ρ], it is true that C(q¯ρ(θ), θ) >
C(q¯ρ(γθ), γθ), or equivalently q¯ρ(θ) > γq¯ρ(γθ). Therefore, Bρ θ(θ, ρ) > 0, implying
pieρ θ(θ, ρ) > 0 since Rρ θ(ρ, γ) = 0. Additionally, for all ρ ∈ [0, 1], pie,ρ,γρ ρ (θ) < 0 by
Lemma 3 (thanks to Assumptions 6-8 and 9-[ρ]). Since pieρ(θ, ρ
∗(θ)) = 0, ρ∗(θ) must
be increasing in θ ∈ (0, θ1]. 
Proof of Corollary 3. Pick any θ ∈ (0, θ1]. Assumption 9-[0] implies Assumption
10. Since Assumptions 2-8 and 10 hold and Assumption 9-[ρ] holds for all ρ ∈ [0, 1),
Proposition 3 ensures that ρ∗(θ) is unique, lies in (0,1), and satisfies pieρ(θ, ρ
∗(θ)) = 0
as in (37). Now, pick any ρ ∈ [0, 1). First, let α = 1. From equations (22), (23), and
(24) it follows that q¯ρ(θ) = q¯(θ) = D(θ), hence q¯ρρ(θ) = 0 for all θ ∈ (0, θ1]. Since
Assumption 9-[ρ] holds, r¯ρ(θ) = 1 for all θ ∈ (0, θ1]. Thus, equation (35) implies
Bρ(θ, ρ) =
∫ θ
γθ
q¯(x)dx. It follows that Bρ γ(θ, ρ) = −θq¯(γθ) < 0; implying pieρ γ(θ, ρ) =
−θq¯(γθ)−Rρ γ(ρ, γ) < 0 by Assumption 12. Moreover, for all ρ ∈ [0, 1), pieρρ(θ, ρ) < 0
by Lemma 3 (thanks to Assumptions 6-8 and 9-[ρ]). Since pieρ(θ, ρ
∗(θ)) = 0, ρ∗(θ)
must be decreasing in γ ∈ (0, 1).
Finally, since Bρ γ(θ, ρ) is continuous in α and the differences q¯
ρ(.) − q¯(.) and
q¯ρρ(.) − q¯ρ(.) = q¯ρρ(.) are negligible when 1 − α is sufficiently small, the above result
obtained for α = 1 is also true for all α ∈ [0, 1] which are sufficiently close to 1. 
Proof of Corollary 4. Pick any θ ∈ (0, θ1]. Since Assumptions 2-8 and 10 hold and
Assumption 9-[ρ] holds for all ρ ∈ [0, 1), Proposition 3 ensures that ρ∗(θ) is unique,
lies in (0,1), and satisfies pieρ(θ, ρ
∗(θ)) = 0 as in (37). Now, pick any ρ ∈ [0, 1). Since
Assumption 9-[ρ] holds, r¯ρ(θ) = 1 for all θ ∈ (0, θ1]. It follows from (22) and (23)
that q¯ρ(θ) is increasing in both α ∈ [0, 1] and D0 ∈ (0,∞). Moreover, we have
∂2q¯ρ(θ)/∂ρ∂α = −D′(p¯ρ(θ))∂(Gρ(θ)/gρ(θ))/∂ρ > 0 (62)
and
∂2q¯ρ(θ)/∂ρ∂D0 = 0. (63)
Then, it follows from (35) that Bρα(θ, ρ) > 0 and BρD0(θ ρ) > 0, implying
pieρα(θ, ρ) > 0 and pi
e
ρD0
(θ, ρ) > 0. Moreover, for all ρ ∈ [0, 1), pie,ρ,γρ ρ (θ) < 0 by
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Lemma 3 (thanks to Assumptions 6-8 and 9-[ρ]). Since pieρ(θ, ρ
∗(θ)) = 0, ρ∗(θ) must
be increasing in both α ∈ [0, 1] and D0 ∈ (0,∞). 
Proof of Proposition 4. Pick any θ ∈ (0, θ1]. By Assumption 1, the optimal
regulatory policy is given by (13)-(16). Assumption 9-[0] implies that r¯(.) = 1.
Then, (46) is the first order condition for the problem in (45). The marginal benefit
of R&D activities
∫ θ
γθ
q¯(x)dx is always positive by (13), and (14). Then, Assumptions
3 and 4 imply ρ∗(θ) > 0, whereas Assumption 5 implies ρ∗(θ) < 1. On the other
hand, Assumptions 2 and 6 together imply that Rρ(ρ
∗(θ), γ) > R(ρ∗(θ), γ)/ρ∗(θ);
so (44) is satisfied at ρ∗(θ). Finally, the second order condition holds, since
pieρρ(θ, ρ) = −Rρρ(ρ, γ) < 0 by Assumption 6. This also ensures that ρ∗(θ) is unique.

Proof of Corollary 5. Pick any θ ∈ (0, θ1]. Since Assumptions 1-6 and 9-[0] hold,
Proposition 4 ensures that ρ∗(θ) is unique, lies in (0,1), and satisfies pieρ(θ, ρ
∗(θ)) = 0
as in (46). By Assumption 1, the optimal regulatory policy is given by (13)-(16).
Assumption 9-[0] implies that r¯(.) = 1. Now pick any ρ ∈ (0, θ1]. Differentiating
(41) with respect to θ yields
pieρ θ(θ, ρ) = q¯(θ)− γq¯(γθ), (64)
which is always positive, since γ < 1, Assumption 11-[0] holds, and q¯(.) is de-
creasing by (13) and (14), thanks to Assumption 1. Moreover, for all ρ ∈ [0, 1),
pieρρ(θ, ρ) = −Rρρ(ρ, γ) < 0 by Assumption 6. Since pieρ(θ, ρ∗(θ)) = 0, ρ∗(θ) must be
increasing in θ ∈ (0, θ1]. 
Proof of Corollary 6. Pick any θ ∈ (0, θ1]. Since Assumptions 1-6 and 9-[0] hold,
Proposition 4 ensures that ρ∗(θ) is unique, lies in (0,1), and satisfies pieρ(θ, ρ
∗(θ)) = 0
as in (46). By Assumption 1, the optimal regulatory policy is given by (13)-(16).
Assumption 9-[0] implies that r¯(.) = 1. Now pick any ρ ∈ (0, θ1]. Differentiating
(41) with respect to γ yields
pieρ γ(θ, ρ) = −θq¯(γθ)−Rρ γ(ρ, γ), (65)
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which is always negative, since Assumption 12 holds, θ > 0, γ > 0, and q¯(γθ) > 0,
by equations (13) and (14). On the other hand, for any z ∈ {α,D0}, differentiating
(41) with respect to z yields
pieρ z(θ, ρ) =
∫ θ
γθ
q¯z(x)dx, (66)
which is always positive, since q¯(.) is increasing in both α and D0 by equations
(13) and (14). Moreover, for all ρ ∈ [0, 1), we have pieρρ(θ, ρ) = −Rρρ(ρ, γ) < 0 by
Assumption 6. Since pieρ(θ, ρ
∗(θ)) = 0, ρ∗(θ) must be decreasing in γ ∈ (0, 1) and
increasing in both α ∈ [0, 1] and D0 ∈ (0,∞). 
Proof of Proposition 5. Let us first show part (i) holds. Let α = 1. Then, it
follows from Propositions 1 and 2 that q¯ρ(θ) = q¯(θ) = D(θ) for all θ ∈ (0, θ1]. In
that case, the profit pie(θ, ρ) under both observable and unobservable R&D is given
by
pie(θ, ρ) =
∫ θ1
θ
D(x)dx+ ρ
∫ θ
γθ
D(x)dx−R(ρ, γ). (67)
Thus, the optimal level of R&D activities, will be the same irrespective of the
observability of R&D. Now, we will consider part (ii) of Proposition 5. Let
α ∈ [0, 1). Pick any θ ∈ (0, θ1], γ ∈ (0, 1), and ρ ∈ [0, 1). Note from (41)
that when R&D activities are unobservable (Section 3.2), the marginal (ex-
pected) benefit becomes Bunobsρ (θ, ρ) =
∫ θ
γθ
q¯(x)dx. On the other hand, when
R&D activities are observable (Section 3.1), the marginal benefit is equal to
Bobsρ (θ, ρ) =
∫ θ1
θ
q¯ρρ(x)dx +
∫ θ
γθ
q¯ρ(x)dx + ρ
∫ θ
γθ
q¯ρρ(x)dx, as was presented in equa-
tion (35). By Corollary 1, q¯ρρ(.) < 0. We also have q¯
0(.) = q¯(.), by equations
(20), (22), and (23). Thus, q¯ρ(.) ≤ q¯0(.) = q¯(.). These observations imply that
Bobsρ (θ, ρ) <
∫ θ
γθ
q¯(x)dx = Bunobsρ (θ, ρ). Since B
obs
ρ,ρ (θ, ρ) < 0 and B
unobs
ρ,ρ (θ, ρ) = 0 for
all ρ ∈ [0, 1), none of the two marginal benefit curves is ever upward sloping. On the
other hand, irrespective of the observability of R&D, we always have Rρ,ρ(ρ, γ) > 0
for all ρ ∈ [0, 1), implying that the marginal cost curve is everywhere upward sloping.
Since ρ∗(θ) is found at the intersection of the marginal benefit and the marginal
cost curves, and since the curve Bobsρ (θ, .) everywhere lies below B
unobs
ρ (θ, .), ρ
∗(θ)
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must be lower when R&D activities are observable than when they are not. 
Proof of Proposition 6. Pick any θ ∈ (0, θ1]. Note that equation (56) is the first
order necessary condition pim,eρ (θ, ρ
m(θ)) = 0 for an interior solution to the problem
in (53). Assumptions 3 and 4 imply ρ∗(θ) > 0, since the left hand side of (56) is
always positive. On the other hand, Assumption 5 implies that ρ∗(θ) < 1. Finally,
Assumptions 2 and 6 together imply that Rρ(ρ
m(θ), γ) > R(ρm(θ), γ)/ρm(θ); so (52)
is satisfied at ρm(θ). Finally, given equation (55) and Assumption 6, it is obvious
that ρm(θ) satisfies the second-order condition and it is unique. 
Proof of Proposition 7. Pick any θ ∈ (0, θ1]. Since Assumptions 1-6 and 9-[0]
hold, Proposition 4 ensures that the optimal R&D choice, ρ∗(θ), of the regulated
monopolist is unique, lies in (0,1), and satisfies equation (46). Also note that since
R&D is unobservable, the optimal regulatory policy is given by (13)-(16), by As-
sumption 1. First let α = 1. Then, q¯(x) = D(x) for all x ∈ (0, θ1]. It follows from
(41) that for all ρ ∈ [0, 1)
Bρ(θ, ρ) =
∫ θ
γθ
q¯(x)dx =
∫ θ
γθ
(D0 −D1x) dx = (1− γ)θ D
(
(1 + γ)θ
2
)
. (68)
So, Bρ(θ, ρ) = 2B
m
ρ (θ, ρ) for all ρ ∈ [0, 1). Using optimality conditions
Bρ(θ, ρ
∗(θ)) = Rρ(ρ∗(θ), γ) and Bmρ (θ, ρ
m(θ)) = Rρ(ρ
m(θ), γ), along with the fact
Bρ,ρ(θ, ρ) = B
m
ρ,ρ(θ, ρ) = 0 and Assumption 6, we can conclude that ρ
∗(θ) > ρm(θ).
Now consider α 6= 1. Since q¯(.) is continuous in α, Bρ(θ, ρ) will be continuous, too.
Thus, the proof for α = 1 will also be valid for α ∈ [0, 1] which are sufficiently close
to 1. 
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